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Abstract 
Techniques for determining and applying security decisions typically follow risk-based 
analytical approaches where alternative options are put forward and weighed in accordance to 
risk severity metrics based on goals and context. The reasoning or validity behind decision 
making can, however, prove difficult to determine in conditions characterised by uncertainty 
stemming from environments with insufficient or incoherent information. This paper 
approaches the problem by proposing a conceptual model that provides security decision 
making traceability through auditing decision makers’ rationalisation of risk. Additionally, the 
model highlights the role metacognition plays in identifying and understanding information 
affordances used for decision making. 
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1 Introduction 
Security analysts regularly face the challenge of justifying decisions made under risk 
and uncertain conditions. While uncertainty stems from various sources such as 
dynamic conditions and information limitations, complications in decision making 
also arise because risk stems from multiple factors, rather than a single root cause 
(Hoffman et al., 2017). Analysts aim at identifying the best possible option, given the 
limited information; few decisions are actually made with absolute certainty (Huber, 
2014) reflecting the difference between optimising in rational decision making, and 
satisficing in bounded rationality (Simon, 1972) driven, naturalistic decision making. 
When decision making under risk and uncertainty fails, the post-incident privilege of 
hindsight available to others fails to portray the complexity of decision making in 
action. Similarly, value is lost when decision making knowledge gained remains tacit 
and cannot be communicated. To address these problems, the research aimed at 
formulating a systematic approach for providing traceability to the rationale behind 
security decision making during risk and uncertainty.  
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2 Related work 
Decision making research has typically followed the normative or descriptive 
approach. Normative approaches model how decisions should be made; descriptive 
approaches understand how decisions are actually made. The normative approach’s 
usefulness may be seen in its ability in providing theoretical adequacy for rational 
choice, whereas the descriptive approach’s usefulness may be seen through empirical 
validity by uncovering insight in decision making (Bell et al., 1988). An alternative 
view is the categorisation of decision making research, based on the study 
environment. This may be the lab-based approach where studies are conducted in 
controlled environments and data collection is determined by predefined tests, or the 
naturalistic approach where studies are conducted in real settings and data collection 
is based on the observation of actual events (Klein, 2008). The differences in 
approaches do not imply that one is better than the other, but that each is suitable based 
on research objectives. 
Descriptive research on expert decision making during risk and uncertainty focusses 
on context-specific decision making. This has been led by Klein's (1999) research on 
naturalistic decision making, where they identified that during uncertainty, 
experienced firefighters use situational familiarity to make quick decisions as opposed 
to weighing all available options. In the same line, Wong presents a research series on 
how criminal intelligence analysts think (Wong, 2014: Wong and Kodagoda, 2015; 
Gerber et al., 2016). Among the various strategies identified, they suggest that during 
the absence of clear facts, a leap of faith occurs between intuition and insight that 
allows the decision makers to reach a preliminary comprehension of a situation. Hibshi 
et al., (2014) explores techniques taken by security experts as they transition through 
levels of situation awareness to identify security requirements. They identify that 
experts seem to skip some stages of situation awareness and this may be attributed to 
situation familiarity based on experience.  
What is common in the above literature is the realisation that experts take leaps in 
decision making. While these findings are insightful, they do little in providing 
traceability to the rationale behind decision making and this is where normative 
approaches are beneficial through the provision of blueprints upon which sensemaking 
may be traced and communicated. Early work by Rasmussen (1974) on the Decision 
ladder template has played a key role in identifying the generic categories of activity 
in decision making, and similarly, Boyd (1996) and Endsley (1995) played key roles 
in formalising the awareness steps leading to decision making. Unfortunately, 
normative approaches are usually too high-level and generalised, rendering them 
incapable of providing low-level context-specific information. 
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3 Model Design 
 
Figure 1: Risk Rationalisation Flow 
We propose a normative model that provides traceability to security analysts’ 
rationalisation of risk under uncertain conditions. The normative model builds on 
lessons learned from two studies with cyber security analysts and was formalised 
systematically using OODA (Boyd, 1996). The first study (M’manga et al., 2017) was 
conducted with 10 analysts from three different organisations with the aim of 
investigating factors influencing analysts’ interpretation of risk during proactive risk 
analysis (vulnerability assessment and goal conflicts). Findings included risk 
interpretation influencers and risk analysis workflows. Building on the first, the second 
study (M’manga et al., 2018) was conducted with 30 analysts from 11 different sectors, 
it aimed at investigating risk rationalisation steps taken during reactive risk analysis 
(incidence response).     
The normative model consists of eight steps to risk rationalisation and contains two 
complementary elements; the flow and actions collectively referred to as the risk 
rationalisation process (RRP). The first element is a risk rationalisation flow (RRF) 
highlighting cognitive sequences and iterations during risk rationalisation. Illustrated 
in Figure 1, RRF indicates two alternative starting points; the Reactive risk analysis 
beginning with Situation assessment and continues to Goal formation, or the Proactive 
risk analysis that takes the inverse approach of beginning with Goal formation and 
continues to Situation assessment. The difference is based on the understanding that 
incidents precede response strategy in reactive analysis; therefore situation assessment 
begins before goals are formed, while the inverse is true for proactive analysis. The 
second phase of RRF consists of the three cognitive actives; Information needs 
assessment, Information exploration and Information limitations analysis. The 
adjacent illustration indicates that the steps may overlap and occur in various orders. 
Options generation and analysis, Option validation, and Option selection form the 
final three steps and they occur in sequence. Risk rationalisation is an iterative process 
and this is illustrated in RRF by the double back arrows at each point of possible 
iteration.  
The second element of the normative model consists of the risk rationalisation actions 
(Figure 2). The actions address the lack of low-level detail in normative models by 
providing context-oriented meta-cognitive questions at each rationalisation step. 
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Metacognition is defined as awareness or analysis of one’s own thinking processes, 
and this may further be explained as the knowledge of knowledge (what one knows 
about cognition), or the regulation of knowledge (how one uses that knowledge to 
regulate cognition) (Schraw and Moshman, 1995). For instance, to understand the 
rationale behind the characterisation of a situation, the question “how may a situation 
be understood?” is presented. The risk rationalisation actions take this a step further 
by defining sub-procedures clarifying the questions which could, in this case, be 
through data correlation, explained as the putting together of disparate data sets to 
derive meaning. By using the steps, meta-cognitive questions and sub-procedures, our 
normative approach aims at understanding the rationale behind decision making 
irrespective of the decision maker’s expertise. We detail the eight RRP steps below. 
3.1 Situation assessment 
Situation assessment corresponds to OODA’s Observe. During this step, the aim is to 
understand how the decision maker identifies factors aiding in situation understanding 
and not the actual analysis of the situation. The meta-cognitive question “how may the 
situational be understood?” is presented and expanded into four possible sub-
procedures;  
 Knowledge of a situation: Recognition through situation familiarity and the 
knowledge of normal. 
 Knowledge of evidence: Recognising information affordances in an 
environment to achieve greater awareness. 
 Situational time-line: Recognising whether a situation is static or evolving, 
current or elapsed.  
 Data Correlation: Recognising available or required data correlation needs to 
achieve greater awareness. 
 
3.2 Goal formation 
Goal formation is the second step corresponding to OODA’s Observe. The objective 
is to understand the strategies used to establish decision goals, identify tensions that 
may restrict goals from coming to fruition, and the determination of the relevance 
scope within which a decision is made. The relevance scope acts as a minimum level 
for the continued pursuit of a goal. For example, analysts we interviewed in M’manga 
et al., (2017) expressed that the inner workings of some of the proprietary security 
products they used were unknown to them. However, based on the product’s benefit, 
they found uncovering the potential risk unnecessary. 
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Figure 2: Risk Rationalisation Actions 
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3.3 Information needs assessment 
Information needs assessment is one of three steps corresponding to OODA’s Orient. 
The objective is to understand how the decision maker identifies information relevant 
to decision making and excess information for filtering. The decision maker’s 
assessment is based on information credibility determined by factors identified during 
Situation assessment and the relevance scope identified during Goal formation. 
Typical examples are the procedures taken to identify false positives.   
3.4 Information exploration 
During Information exploration, it is recognised that decisions are determined by 
information availability and when information is unavailable, possible alternatives are 
explored. The focus is therefore placed on understanding the strategies for identifying 
the alternative sources of information. To the decision maker, the exploration of 
additional information sources is subject to time availability. Information sources may 
be subject matter experts within an analysts’ environment (e.g. legal officer, public 
relations manager), or external expertise such as Computer Emergency Response 
Teams (CERTs). 
3.5 Information limitations analysis 
Information limitations analysis is driven by the question, what remains unknown? 
This is presented with the aim of understanding how the decision maker identifies 
critical information gaps and the conclusion drawn from the knowledge. Information 
gaps refer to the known-unknowns critical for informed decision making. For example, 
it would greatly aid an analyst to acknowledge that an attack vector has been identified 
although the motive remains unknown. Knowledge of the motive could hint at the 
possibility of a follow-up attacks leading to better preparedness (Rashid et al., 2016). 
3.6 Options generation and analysis 
Options generation and analysis is the first of two steps corresponding to OODA’s 
Decide. Based on the cumulative understanding from the previous steps, the decision 
maker identifies possible options for decision formulation and their implications. For 
example, an analyst’s response to a data breach could be to refrain from disclosing the 
breach, even though data protection regulations advise otherwise. The aim of the step 
is to identify and understand the reasoning behind options considered by the decision 
maker. At this point, poor understanding may inadvertently lead to meta-risk; risk 
resulting from risk response (e.g. increased threat exposure).  
3.7 Options validation 
Options validation focusses on uncertainty by verifying if there were elements of 
uncertainty hindering the decision making process and how it was managed. To 
simplify the understanding and expression of uncertainty, the meta-cognitive question 
posed is; where could assumptions be incorrect? Validating one’s own actions is by 
no means an easy task. Failure at the stage introduces a second form of meta-risk, 
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which is the risk of risk understanding due to uncertainty. We categorise the elements 
of uncertainty into four groups: 
 
 Environmental factors: dynamic environments, inconsistent or limited 
information from the environment. 
 Contextual factors: time limitations, situation complexity or magnitude. 
 Personal factors: experience, training and cognitive limitations. 
 Information factors: accurate, current, relevant specific, understandable, 
comprehensive, unbiased and comparable (Wang et al., 2005).  
 
 
3.8 Option selection 
Option Selection corresponds to OODA’s Act. As a final step, the most informed and 
objective option is put forward as the basis for a decision. The option should not come 
as a surprise where the rationale is traceable. 
4 Model validation 
The model was validated using cognitive walkthroughs (Rieman et al., 1995) with 
three security analysts (P1 -3). The three validated the model’s logic flow, and not its 
ability to support risk rationalisation. P1 and P2 worked as part of a cyber security 
team monitoring events within their organisation and possessed 1-3 years’ professional 
experience in security. P3 worked as part of a counter-terrorism and intelligence unit 
and possessed over 24 years of relevant experience. Each participant was provided 
with a copy of RRP and given a brief tutorial on its use. Participants were then 
presented with a scenario about a hypothetical data breach that incorporated tensions 
related to possible decisions and uncertainty due to insufficient information. The 
scenario required the analysts to decide whether to make a breach on a university’s 
network known to affected parties in advance, after remediation, or not at all, and 
taking into account that some of the breached data was already on the Internet. The 
participants were asked to compare the model with decisions they would make in the 
scenario. In addition, P3 run a second validation scenario, based on his experience in 
counter-terrorism. Each walkthrough took approximately 40 minutes, and the 
participants presented their critiques of the model’s logic. Opinions were divided on 
whether Option validation was an independent step or a part of Option generation and 
analysis. We concluded that it remains an independent step to cater for understanding 
inexperienced decision makers lacking the ability to generate and validate decision 
alternatives consecutively. 
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5 Conclusion and future work 
This paper presented a normative model for rationalising analysts’ decision making 
about risk and uncertainty. The propose of the model is not to propose a new approach 
to decision making, but rather to propose a systematic approach capable of 
communicating and providing traceability to the rationale behind security decision 
making during risk and uncertainty. To address this we considered the shortfalls 
presented in descriptive approaches which usually provide no explanation for expert 
judgement and the shortfalls in normative approaches which are usually too high level 
to derive contextual meaning. The benefit and use of the model are in several folds. 
Firstly the model is designed as a series of steps, meta-cognitive questions and sub-
procedures that may be used as a blueprint by stakeholders unfamiliar with risk 
analysis procedures in security such as the different approaches to proactive and 
reactive analysis. Second, the model may be used in training analysts be identifying 
gaps in their reasoning when compared to model steps. And third, the model may be 
used as a basis for eliciting design requirements that would facilitate decision making 
about risk through the identification of critical areas of risk rationalisation.  
The model places emphasis on validation and the consideration of uncertainty by 
highlighting the iterative nature of decision flows, presenting an options validation 
step, and the consideration of meta-risk in various forms. We believe that the model 
will complement existing decision making and awareness approaches lacking a focus 
on risk and uncertainty. For future work, we are investigating techniques to elicit 
design requirements for risk-based decision making, based on data collected using 
RRP. 
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